The Jodi Arias case is up for Appellate review and here are some of the issues which could bring about a new trial and a new verdict in the case:
1 Intimidation of
defense. Defense counsel, expert witnesses, and prospective character
witnesses all received death threats, other threats, or actual injuries which
affected their behavior. For example, domestic-violence expert Alyce LaViolette,
during her testimony, was treated in hospital for anxiety. At the same time,
there was a national campaign to ruin her reputation by posting bad reviews of
her books and by pressing organizations to cancel speaking engagements. The
judge took no effective action to protect the defense from any of these acts,
which are state, and arguably federal, crimes.
2 Due process I: essential
elements. Arias was charged with first-degree murder on two alternate
theories: premeditation and felony murder. Yet the felony in question was never
definitely specified, even in the state’s closing argument. At midtrial, and
briefly in closing, the state said it was second-degree burglary with intent to
assault. More often in closing, the state said it was second-degree burglary
with intent to steal a gun. It should be viewed as a Sixth-Amendment violation
for a defendant not to know the details of the charges against her – the
essential elements of the crime — until rebuttal by evidence is no longer
possible.
3 Due process II: guilt via state
falsehood. In closing, the state invited the jury to convict Arias of
felony murder based on this second-degree burglary of unlawfully remaining in
Travis Alexander’s house with the intent to steal his gun. Yet the state, in
attacking Arias’ self-defense story, had argued vigorously that Alexander owned
no gun. Rather, a mainstay of its case for premeditation was to accuse Arias of
stealing her grandfather’s gun a week before. Thus, the jury was invited to
convict her of a crime by finding that one of the state’s own main assertions
was false beyond reasonable doubt. That is likewise inconsistent with due
process.
4 Irrational verdict I: felony
murder. In the end, seven jurors voted for both premeditation and
felony murder, though in the state’s case they were alternatives. Apart from
that, there are two reasons why these votes should have been voided.
First, the state provided exactly zero evidence for felony murder beyond the
killing itself and the gun theft, which were undisputed. In closing, the
prosecutor falsely claimed that these two elements suffice for felony murder.
Rather, what is also required, on the gun-theft theory, is that Arias, in
remaining, had the “objective” (the jury instructions’ gloss on ‘intent’) of
stealing Alexander’s gun, and killed him in furtherance of that goal. But there
was no evidence for this, and no reasonable juror could believe it. Obviously,
Arias took away the gun to hide her role in his death; she did not kill him to
get a cheap gun, for which, defense and prosecution agreed, she had sources near
home, not a thousand miles away. The judge should have simply dismissed the
felony-murder charge, as the defense had asked before.
5 Irrational verdict II:
premeditation. These seven jurors, at any rate, could not have rested
their premeditation vote on a belief that Arias stole her grandfather’s gun. But
the remaining evidence of premeditation is very weak. It consists of aspects of
a trip that any traveler might do or suffer, amid multiple facts negating
concealment. To dye your hair, to rent a car in a different town, to ask not to
have a red one, to take gas cans into the desert, to turn off (or lose power to)
your cellphone there, to find your license plate upside down – all these have
obvious innocent explanations. On the other hand, as the defense noted, no one
seeking to conceal her trip would borrow gas cans from a friend, visit other
friends along the way, make multiple bank transactions, stop at a beauty salon,
buy gas with a debit card when ample cash was at hand, or save her receipts.
On such facts, a competent, unbiased judge would void these seven jurors’
premeditation votes as unreasonable. With both votes of the seven nullified, the
verdict falls.
6 State perjury. Taken
together, medical examiner Kevin Horn’s autopsy report and his testimony assert
an anatomical impossibility: that the bullet passed through Alexander’s right
frontal lobe, yet his dura mater (the outermost membrane covering the brain) was
intact. This is as impossible as a bullet’s piercing the heart without breaking
the skin. At trial, Horn said his dura-mater statement was a “typo.” But he did
not say what it could be a typo for. The error could not be just a missing
‘not’: autopsy reports describe injuries; they do not merely say organs are “not
intact.” Moreover, the actual statement (p. 7) is: “The dura mater and falx
cerebri are intact.” The falx cerebri is nowhere near the alleged bullet
track.
Also, at a pretrial hearing and in depositions, Detective Esteban Flores
testified that, based on what Horn had told him the day before the hearing, the
gunshot came first, and it did not incapacitate Alexander or did so only
briefly. This agrees with Arias’ self-defense story. At trial, however, Horn
claimed that the gunshot wound came last and had to be incapacitating. He also
claimed that he could not recall ever speaking to Flores about the case. So,
before or during trial, the state switched not just the details of its charges,
but even its key facts.
It is probable that one or both of these state witnesses committed
perjury.
7 Other prosecution
misconduct. Prosecutor Juan Martinez denied the existence of
evidence, then introduced it against the defendant at trial. He also withheld
other key evidence, like the camera, from the defense. At trial, he threw
objects around the courtroom, including an exhibit (the camera). He continually
bullied defense witnesses, including experts, argued with them, cut off their
answers, and distorted their testimony. He even misdescribed his own witness’s
testimony (the “bloody” handprint, which a state witness had said tested
negative for blood). Defense objections to his outrageous courtroom conduct were
consistently but wrongly overruled. In closing, he flagrantly misstated the law
of felony murder (§4).
8 Nonsequestration of
jury. An unprecedented media campaign of hatred against Arias
preceded and accompanied the trial. One channel, HLN, devoted eight or more
hours a day to mocking, vilifying, dehumanizing, and demonizing her. HLN’s
torrent of abuse and prejudice has no counterpart but Oceania’s campaign against
Emmanuel Goldstein, in 1984. Numerous hate sites also sprang up in social
media.
Jurors had free access via internet to all of this prejudicial material – not
just at home, but even in the courthouse itself. The judge’s actions to avoid
jury taint were clearly ineffective, since a dismissed juror admitted talking
with other people about the case, though he had never said so when questioned by
the judge. A juror question also showed access to news coverage. Even County
Attorney Bill Montgomery had warned against not sequestering the jury in a case
of such national prominence.
9 Reasonable doubt on
self-defense. LaViolette explained how the Alexander-Arias
relationship resembled the abusive ones on which she is an expert, and she found
Arias’ story entirely credible. The prosecution bore the burden (in Arizona) of
disproving self-defense beyond reasonable doubt. On what basis can a juror
conclude that an expert opinion is false beyond reasonable doubt? True, the jury
had other evidence besides. But the state had earlier denied its own gunshot
claims (§6), incapacitation was further rebutted by a defense brain expert, and
the premeditation evidence was very weak (§5). None of this extra evidence shows
that no reasonable person could hold LaViolette’s view of Arias’ mental state,
as is required to vote for conviction.
10 Governor’s statement of
guilt. To complete a perfect storm of injustice, Arizona governor Jan
Brewer stated on television that Arias was guilty – during jury
deliberations.